WEBVTT

0:00:07.040000 --> 0:00:11.560000
 So, as the title suggests, in this video,
 we're going to be understanding

0:00:11.560000 --> 0:00:17.360000
 or taking a look at the process of analyzing
 IUCs and more specifically

0:00:17.360000 --> 0:00:22.240000
 as part of the analysis, we're going
 to be exploring enrichment, right?

0:00:22.240000 --> 0:00:25.360000
 So let's not waste any time.

0:00:25.360000 --> 0:00:27.620000
 What is IUC analysis?

0:00:27.620000 --> 0:00:33.060000
 In the previous video, we got an intro
 to IUCs, indicators of compromise,

0:00:33.060000 --> 0:00:36.740000
 and we went through the various types
 or categories and then some common

0:00:36.740000 --> 0:00:46.920000
 examples. And we also took a look at
 the process of IUC identification

0:00:46.920000 --> 0:00:48.460000
 and what that entails.

0:00:48.460000 --> 0:00:53.660000
 So, we can now move to the next logical
 step, which is IUC analysis, which

0:00:53.660000 --> 0:00:59.060000
 is again something you may not really
 have heard of before as a process,

0:00:59.060000 --> 0:01:07.100000
 but it's something that, again, is something
 that can be defined as analysis

0:01:07.100000 --> 0:01:15.980000
 because of all the steps that are included
 as a subset of the analysis.

0:01:15.980000 --> 0:01:18.840000
 And this will make sense in a second.

0:01:18.840000 --> 0:01:23.380000
 So, IUC analysis is the process of investigating
 and understanding indicators

0:01:23.380000 --> 0:01:29.160000
 of compromise, like suspicious IP addresses,
 file hashes or domains, in

0:01:29.160000 --> 0:01:32.400000
 order to figure out if they're
 part of a cyber attack.

0:01:32.400000 --> 0:01:37.920000
 So, essentially, what I call IUC analysis
 is the process of investigating,

0:01:37.920000 --> 0:01:42.760000
 understanding indicators of compromise,
 but also validating them.

0:01:42.760000 --> 0:01:47.580000
 So, the best way to understand IUC analysis
 is to think of it like being

0:01:47.580000 --> 0:01:49.300000
 a digital detective, right?

0:01:49.300000 --> 0:01:54.820000
 So, you find a clue, in this case,
 an IUC in an alert or log, right?

0:01:54.820000 --> 0:02:00.780000
 And you look it up to see if it's known
 to be bad or involved in bad activity.

0:02:00.780000 --> 0:02:04.980000
 And you check where it came from, who
 used it and what it tried to do.

0:02:04.980000 --> 0:02:07.780000
 And you decide if it's dangerous
 and if action is needed.

0:02:07.780000 --> 0:02:11.020000
 So, this is what IUC analysis
 is all about.

0:02:11.020000 --> 0:02:14.460000
 And you'll understand where enrichment
 got, you know, where that comes

0:02:14.460000 --> 0:02:17.000000
 into play with regards to analysis.

0:02:17.000000 --> 0:02:19.620000
 So, let's get into IUC enrichment.

0:02:19.620000 --> 0:02:24.280000
 So, IUC enrichment is the process of
 adding contextual information to

0:02:24.280000 --> 0:02:29.920000
 raw indicators of compromise because indicators
 of compromise can be qualitatively

0:02:29.920000 --> 0:02:38.980000
 raw, as it were, and enriched, and
 they're enriched through or through

0:02:38.980000 --> 0:02:43.640000
 the process of adding contextual
 information to them, right?

0:02:43.640000 --> 0:02:49.260000
 And you do this to make these indicators
 of compromise, these raw indicators

0:02:49.260000 --> 0:02:54.220000
 of compromise more actionable, accurate
 and meaningful for the purposes

0:02:54.220000 --> 0:02:58.280000
 of detection, triage, investigation,
 and of course response.

0:02:58.280000 --> 0:03:04.440000
 So, while raw IUCs, like an IP or a
 file hash, and remember I mentioned

0:03:04.440000 --> 0:03:10.040000
 this when we were getting into IUCs,
 I talked about how, you know, if

0:03:10.040000 --> 0:03:14.720000
 you're new to IUCs and I tell you that
 an IP address is an indicator of

0:03:14.720000 --> 0:03:19.240000
 compromise, you probably would have
 asked yourself, well, how is that

0:03:19.240000 --> 0:03:25.780000
 indicative of, how is that an indicator
 of compromise or of any of anything

0:03:25.780000 --> 0:03:30.800000
 suspicious? And I mentioned to you that
 you need to sort of analyze them

0:03:30.800000 --> 0:03:34.740000
 more, and this is where enrichment
 comes into play.

0:03:34.740000 --> 0:03:39.160000
 I mentioned I use the word analyze
 very importantly because enrichment

0:03:39.160000 --> 0:03:41.080000
 is part of the analysis process.

0:03:41.080000 --> 0:03:46.080000
 Hopefully, it's starting to come together
 in terms of you have IUCs.

0:03:46.080000 --> 0:03:52.160000
 When we're talking about raw IUCs, they
 don't, you know, there's not really

0:03:52.160000 --> 0:03:57.660000
 much information associated or
 attached to them to begin with.

0:03:57.660000 --> 0:04:03.820000
 And you know, based on that, you know,
 beginner or if you look at it from,

0:04:03.820000 --> 0:04:09.420000
 you know, from a very basic point of
 view, you probably arrive at the

0:04:09.420000 --> 0:04:12.340000
 conclusion that that's not really an
 indicator of anything and you're

0:04:12.340000 --> 0:04:15.620000
 right. And this is where the analysis
 comes into play, right?

0:04:15.620000 --> 0:04:21.460000
 So you know about the types of the
 various types of IUCs as I covered

0:04:21.460000 --> 0:04:26.860000
 in the previous video, and we mentioned
 the categories or network based

0:04:26.860000 --> 0:04:28.200000
 IUCs, et cetera.

0:04:28.200000 --> 0:04:33.480000
 So when you approach IUCs from that
 perspective, so let's say you find

0:04:33.480000 --> 0:04:41.400000
 a log with an IP address, it could be, you
 know, a log pertinent to authentication

0:04:41.400000 --> 0:04:43.280000
 or something like this.

0:04:43.280000 --> 0:04:45.300000
 Not really important.

0:04:45.300000 --> 0:04:48.600000
 What was the log is pertinent?

0:04:48.600000 --> 0:04:49.540000
 Of course, it is important.

0:04:49.540000 --> 0:04:51.820000
 That's the first part of enrichment.

0:04:51.820000 --> 0:04:55.460000
 But the first thing you should be doing
 is saying, okay, that's a network

0:04:55.460000 --> 0:04:58.040000
 based IUC from that point on.

0:04:58.040000 --> 0:05:02.940000
 And the reason that classification is
 important is because it then tells

0:05:02.940000 --> 0:05:10.540000
 you what tools or what you need to
 do to analyze that specific type of

0:05:10.540000 --> 0:05:15.100000
 IUC. So if you don't categorize
 them correctly at that starting.

0:05:15.100000 --> 0:05:19.300000
 So if you just go, oh, this is an IP
 address, you don't know what to do.

0:05:19.300000 --> 0:05:23.520000
 But if you classify it and say, okay,
 that's a network based IUC, I don't

0:05:23.520000 --> 0:05:24.440000
 know much about it.

0:05:24.440000 --> 0:05:27.900000
 But just by virtue of the fact that
 I know that that's a network based

0:05:27.900000 --> 0:05:34.820000
 IUC, you then know what to do next
 in terms of learning more about it.

0:05:34.820000 --> 0:05:38.560000
 So if you're saying to yourself, well,
 I don't really know what to do

0:05:38.560000 --> 0:05:39.460000
 next. Don't worry.

0:05:39.460000 --> 0:05:40.820000
 That's what I want to cover.

0:05:40.820000 --> 0:05:42.940000
 And that's what enrichment addresses.

0:05:42.940000 --> 0:05:49.680000
 So while raw IOC is like an IP or file
 hash offers clues, enrichment answers

0:05:49.680000 --> 0:05:54.540000
 critical questions like, what does this
 indicator represent in totality

0:05:54.540000 --> 0:05:59.380000
 or holistically be is it
 known to be malicious?

0:05:59.380000 --> 0:06:04.280000
 What threat actors or campaigns
 is it associated with, if any?

0:06:04.280000 --> 0:06:10.240000
 And how urgent is the response
 based on the previous question?

0:06:10.240000 --> 0:06:13.240000
 So hopefully it's starting
 to come together.

0:06:13.240000 --> 0:06:18.340000
 Now, when we talk about the enrichment
 process, there's a couple of enrichment

0:06:18.340000 --> 0:06:21.300000
 techniques that you need to
 be familiar with, right?

0:06:21.300000 --> 0:06:28.300000
 The first is adding contextual data
 or contextualizing an IOC, right?

0:06:28.300000 --> 0:06:33.940000
 So this technique, this type of IUC
 enrichment technique enhances the

0:06:33.940000 --> 0:06:40.220000
 IOC with environmental and threat relevant
 information that helps analysts

0:06:40.220000 --> 0:06:41.540000
 make better decisions.

0:06:41.540000 --> 0:06:43.640000
 That's obviously implied.

0:06:43.640000 --> 0:06:47.560000
 If you're enriching something, you know,
 if you're enriching your understanding

0:06:47.560000 --> 0:06:50.860000
 of something, it helps you make better
 decisions with regards to your

0:06:50.860000 --> 0:06:53.840000
 understanding of that thing, for example.


0:06:53.840000 --> 0:07:01.760000
 So this table sort of outlines the various
 types of what you would call

0:07:01.760000 --> 0:07:06.280000
 contextual enrichment
 when it comes to IOC.

0:07:06.280000 --> 0:07:11.340000
 So the context type to the in the first
 column, you have geolocation ASN,

0:07:11.340000 --> 0:07:14.320000
 who is threat actor association and
 then the purpose on the right.

0:07:14.320000 --> 0:07:19.020000
 So when we talk about geolocation as
 a context type, this is where you

0:07:19.020000 --> 0:07:23.920000
 identify the geographic origin of an
 IP address, for example, C2 traffic

0:07:23.920000 --> 0:07:26.480000
 from a country with known
 threat activity.

0:07:26.480000 --> 0:07:30.000000
 So if you remember what I said in the
 previous slide, when you start off,

0:07:30.000000 --> 0:07:38.060000
 you find a log with a network traffic
 and you say, okay, this is a network

0:07:38.060000 --> 0:07:43.120000
 based IOC, that then tells you what
 to do next based on the type of IOC

0:07:43.120000 --> 0:07:44.180000
 you're dealing with.

0:07:44.180000 --> 0:07:48.260000
 So if it's an IP, this is when you're
 talking about adding contextual

0:07:48.260000 --> 0:07:52.420000
 data, you then start with
 geolocation, right?

0:07:52.420000 --> 0:07:57.060000
 And you're trying to look for the geographic
 origin of the IP, which then

0:07:57.060000 --> 0:08:04.400000
 tells you or probably tell you
 what you're dealing with.

0:08:04.400000 --> 0:08:07.200000
 You probably need to investigate
 that a little bit more.

0:08:07.200000 --> 0:08:09.280000
 You then have the ASN, right?

0:08:09.280000 --> 0:08:11.660000
 So the autonomous system number.

0:08:11.660000 --> 0:08:16.180000
 So you now check, you know, helps
 group IPs by ownership.

0:08:16.180000 --> 0:08:17.880000
 That's what the purpose of ASN.

0:08:17.880000 --> 0:08:22.040000
 So for example, a specific hosting provider
 or, you know, let's say cloud

0:08:22.040000 --> 0:08:29.360000
 flare, when you host an EC2 instance
 and you assign a public IP, if you

0:08:29.360000 --> 0:08:33.800000
 actually perform a look up on that IP,
 whatever that IP address is, I'm

0:08:33.800000 --> 0:08:39.060000
 talking about the public IP address
 and you take a look at the IP ASN

0:08:39.060000 --> 0:08:46.080000
 or the IP block ownership, you'll
 see that they all belong to AWS.

0:08:46.080000 --> 0:08:47.760000
 So what is this useful for?

0:08:47.760000 --> 0:08:51.600000
 It's useful for identifying
 clusters of infrastructure.

0:08:51.600000 --> 0:08:55.040000
 Yeah, barely, it's self evident.

0:08:55.040000 --> 0:08:56.580000
 Then you have who is information.

0:08:56.580000 --> 0:09:03.300000
 So when you find a, this can also apply
 to IP addresses, but when you

0:09:03.300000 --> 0:09:10.820000
 find a URL in a log, so indicative of
 compromise there, what do you do?

0:09:10.820000 --> 0:09:13.460000
 Well, you perform who is look up, right?

0:09:13.460000 --> 0:09:16.120000
 And what does this help with or
 what's the purpose of this?

0:09:16.120000 --> 0:09:20.080000
 Well, it reveals the domain registration
 data like the owner date created

0:09:20.080000 --> 0:09:26.500000
 contact info. So if you see a domain
 within a log and when your performer

0:09:26.500000 --> 0:09:30.300000
 look up on that particular domain and
 you find it was registered within

0:09:30.300000 --> 0:09:35.840000
 the last two weeks and it's quite an odd
 looking domain and it's registered,

0:09:35.840000 --> 0:09:39.440000
 you know, to a particular individual,
 although that information can be

0:09:39.440000 --> 0:09:43.420000
 hidden. You know, you're just trying
 to understand what you're dealing

0:09:43.420000 --> 0:09:55.340000
 with or who this, what owns it, where
 it was registered, how new it is,

0:09:55.340000 --> 0:10:00.880000
 etc. So red flags, as I just mentioned,
 I should have probably went through

0:10:00.880000 --> 0:10:04.200000
 the point. It explains it a little bit
 better, but red flags include newly

0:10:04.200000 --> 0:10:07.940000
 registered domains or privacy
 protected registrations.

0:10:07.940000 --> 0:10:13.340000
 Now that's not always the case because
 you can always buy privacy protection

0:10:13.340000 --> 0:10:17.480000
 for domains when you register them and
 that will obfuscate your personal

0:10:17.480000 --> 0:10:21.700000
 or personally identifiable information
 with regards to, you know, the

0:10:21.700000 --> 0:10:24.520000
 domain registrar.

0:10:24.520000 --> 0:10:27.400000
 And then of course, the other context
 type is threat actor association

0:10:27.400000 --> 0:10:31.440000
 or attribution. So you link the IOC
 to known threat actors or campaigns

0:10:31.440000 --> 0:10:34.600000
 based on threat intelligence reporting.

0:10:34.600000 --> 0:10:38.800000
 And this helps understand the likely
 TTPs and motivations, right?

0:10:38.800000 --> 0:10:41.760000
 So this is adding contextual data.

0:10:41.760000 --> 0:10:45.560000
 The other enrichment technique is leveraging
 threat intelligence sources

0:10:45.560000 --> 0:10:50.200000
 and will be covering threat intelligence
 and threat hunting in detail

0:10:50.200000 --> 0:10:53.860000
 in its own course within
 this learning path.

0:10:53.860000 --> 0:10:58.480000
 And the only reason I'm doing so is
 because threat intel plays a huge

0:10:58.480000 --> 0:11:05.060000
 part in, you know, organizations security
 and likewise threat hunting

0:11:05.060000 --> 0:11:06.860000
 and it needs its own course.

0:11:06.860000 --> 0:11:09.840000
 But it's all going to be in the
 context of instant response.

0:11:09.840000 --> 0:11:12.400000
 In any case, leveraging threat
 intelligence sources.

0:11:12.400000 --> 0:11:16.920000
 So external and internal threat intelligence
 helps validate and enrich

0:11:16.920000 --> 0:11:20.800000
 indicators with global and
 organizational insight.

0:11:20.800000 --> 0:11:24.940000
 So in this case, when we're talking about
 the threat intelligence sources,

0:11:24.940000 --> 0:11:29.400000
 we have external threat feeds, sandbox
 results, passive DNS and passive

0:11:29.400000 --> 0:11:34.660000
 SSL information and internal
 reputation databases.

0:11:34.660000 --> 0:11:38.340000
 So starting with external threat feeds,
 what's the functionality here

0:11:38.340000 --> 0:11:41.180000
 or relevance to IOC enrichment?

0:11:41.180000 --> 0:11:48.260000
 Well, sources like virus total, IP
 abuse, IPDB, Alien Vault OTX, very

0:11:48.260000 --> 0:11:54.140000
 popular, recorded future or commercial
 TI vendors provide reputation scores,

0:11:54.140000 --> 0:11:56.540000
 tagging and relationships.

0:11:56.540000 --> 0:12:02.760000
 In the case of sandbox results, you know,
 dynamic analysis using platforms

0:12:02.760000 --> 0:12:08.980000
 or tools like any dot run, very popular,
 I use it myself, albeit for analyzing

0:12:08.980000 --> 0:12:10.900000
 malicious documents.

0:12:10.900000 --> 0:12:15.300000
 Which will also be covering in the digital
 forensics, for instance, response

0:12:15.300000 --> 0:12:16.900000
 course within this learning path.

0:12:16.900000 --> 0:12:20.380000
 But, you know, I'm just trying to let
 you know we'll be covering a lot

0:12:20.380000 --> 0:12:24.540000
 of this stuff. In any case, you know,
 dynamic analysis using any run,

0:12:24.540000 --> 0:12:29.800000
 for example, or hybrid analysis, simulates
 execution of files or malware

0:12:29.800000 --> 0:12:34.240000
 or URLs in order for you to observe
 the behavior and extract secondary

0:12:34.240000 --> 0:12:38.760000
 IOCs, which I'll touch on in this video.

0:12:38.760000 --> 0:12:41.780000
 You then have passive
 DNS and passive SSL.

0:12:41.780000 --> 0:12:45.440000
 So, you know, this is where you observe
 historic domain IP bearings and

0:12:45.440000 --> 0:12:49.980000
 certificate usage to track infrastructure
 reuse, something that's very

0:12:49.980000 --> 0:12:52.880000
 important. And then internal
 reputation databases.

0:12:52.880000 --> 0:12:58.260000
 So you correlate new IOCs with past
 incidents, you hunt results, threat

0:12:58.260000 --> 0:13:00.080000
 hunting or false positive reports.

0:13:00.080000 --> 0:13:03.940000
 And this is very critical for environment
 specific relevance.

0:13:03.940000 --> 0:13:09.020000
 So this is, you know, using internal
 intelligence or internal reputation

0:13:09.020000 --> 0:13:15.800000
 databases. And then the other enrichment
 technique is, I wouldn't say

0:13:15.800000 --> 0:13:20.020000
 it's a technique, but, you know, it's
 enrichment for enhanced decision

0:13:20.020000 --> 0:13:27.320000
 making. So enrichment or enriched IOCs
 are not just informative, they're

0:13:27.320000 --> 0:13:28.220000
 strategic, right?

0:13:28.220000 --> 0:13:31.220000
 They feed directly into key
 decision making areas.

0:13:31.220000 --> 0:13:34.100000
 And what are these key
 decision making areas?

0:13:34.100000 --> 0:13:36.360000
 Or what are the objectives here?

0:13:36.360000 --> 0:13:40.800000
 Well, we have determining severity, defining
 the scope, prioritizing response

0:13:40.800000 --> 0:13:42.620000
 and triage accuracy.

0:13:42.620000 --> 0:13:48.900000
 So this sort of relates or corresponds
 to why this is important or why

0:13:48.900000 --> 0:13:52.480000
 IOC enrichment is relevant to
 you as an instant responder.

0:13:52.480000 --> 0:13:57.000000
 So when we talk about determining severity
 as an objective and how enrichment

0:13:57.000000 --> 0:14:02.560000
 helps, an IOC linked to a non ransomware
 infrastructure increases the

0:14:02.560000 --> 0:14:03.960000
 criticality of an alert.

0:14:03.960000 --> 0:14:06.520000
 That's self evidently true, right?

0:14:06.520000 --> 0:14:11.020000
 And then when it comes down to defining
 scope, context such as or like,

0:14:11.020000 --> 0:14:14.780000
 you know, multiple host observations,
 lateral movement evidence or multiple

0:14:14.780000 --> 0:14:18.420000
 users interacting with an
 IOC expands the scope.

0:14:18.420000 --> 0:14:23.800000
 So if you see the IOC replicated across
 different systems or just limited

0:14:23.800000 --> 0:14:28.780000
 to one system or one host as it were
 within a network, it tells you what,

0:14:28.780000 --> 0:14:31.260000
 you know, the scope of what
 you're dealing with.

0:14:31.260000 --> 0:14:35.820000
 So that again is also a self explanatory
 to a certain degree.

0:14:35.820000 --> 0:14:37.740000
 And then prioritizing response.

0:14:37.740000 --> 0:14:40.340000
 So how does enrichment help here?

0:14:40.340000 --> 0:14:45.020000
 Well, IOCs associated with low prevalence,
 high impact threats like, you

0:14:45.020000 --> 0:14:50.120000
 know, data exaltration or hands on
 keyboard attacks, warrants, faster

0:14:50.120000 --> 0:14:54.220000
 containment and triage accuracy.

0:14:54.220000 --> 0:14:55.660000
 How does enrichment help here?

0:14:55.660000 --> 0:15:00.300000
 Well, it helps tier one analysts quickly
 identify false positives or escalate

0:15:00.300000 --> 0:15:06.180000
 real threats with confidence because
 again, without IOC enrichment, if

0:15:06.180000 --> 0:15:11.600000
 a tier one analyst did not factor that
 in and they found an IP address,

0:15:11.600000 --> 0:15:16.680000
 you know, and they sort of arrived at
 the, they arrived at the assumption

0:15:16.680000 --> 0:15:24.520000
 that this is malicious or is indicated,
 it's indicative of malicious activity

0:15:24.520000 --> 0:15:27.740000
 and they choose to escalate to the instant
 responder and did not perform

0:15:27.740000 --> 0:15:33.100000
 IOC enrichment in the form of performing
 a lookup on that IP address.

0:15:33.100000 --> 0:15:36.640000
 Then, you know, that's going to lead
 to false positives because then the

0:15:36.640000 --> 0:15:41.400000
 instant responder would perform IOC
 enrichment and they find out that

0:15:41.400000 --> 0:15:45.440000
 that IP is not really malicious, nor has
 it been associated with any malicious

0:15:45.440000 --> 0:15:48.020000
 activity, known malicious activity.

0:15:48.020000 --> 0:15:50.980000
 Of course, I'm not saying that, you
 know, you should die by that sword

0:15:50.980000 --> 0:15:56.260000
 because again, attackers will not be
 using will not always be using known

0:15:56.260000 --> 0:16:02.040000
 indicators of compromise or their activity
 will not elicit known indicators

0:16:02.040000 --> 0:16:07.400000
 of compromise. But the bottom line is
 that performing IOC enrichment really,

0:16:07.400000 --> 0:16:12.960000
 really helps the with triage accuracy
 and for reasons I've just explained

0:16:12.960000 --> 0:16:21.800000
 here. So, now that you understand the
 IOC analysis process as well as

0:16:21.800000 --> 0:16:31.620000
 IOC enrichment, you may as well as instant
 responders, could you please

0:16:31.620000 --> 0:16:39.680000
 tell me who is responsible for what
 with regards to IOCs or what do I

0:16:39.680000 --> 0:16:44.260000
 as an incident responder need to know
 with regards to IOCs or what should

0:16:44.260000 --> 0:16:48.360000
 I be able to do with regards to indicators
 of compromise and that's what

0:16:48.360000 --> 0:16:49.580000
 I seek to address here.

0:16:49.580000 --> 0:16:54.340000
 So, the responsibilities in IOC
 handling or handling IOCs.

0:16:54.340000 --> 0:16:57.740000
 So, let's start off with the tier one
 analyst responsibilities in IOC

0:16:57.740000 --> 0:17:02.160000
 handling. So, the tier one sock analysts
 on the front lines of the instant

0:17:02.160000 --> 0:17:06.260000
 response process in terms
 of detection triage, etc.

0:17:06.260000 --> 0:17:10.660000
 And their role is, as I said to triage
 alerts identify threats early and

0:17:10.660000 --> 0:17:14.220000
 determine if further action is needed,
 especially using IOCs and their

0:17:14.220000 --> 0:17:20.000000
 key responsibilities are with regards
 to IOC handling are alert triage

0:17:20.000000 --> 0:17:21.380000
 and IOC matching.

0:17:21.380000 --> 0:17:26.200000
 So, analysts review alerts generated by
 tools like SEEMS and EDR platforms.

0:17:26.200000 --> 0:17:31.120000
 They look for IOCs, so suspicious
 IPs, domains, file ashes, etc.

0:17:31.120000 --> 0:17:33.000000
 in the alert data.

0:17:33.000000 --> 0:17:36.960000
 And these IOCs are matched
 against known bad lists.

0:17:36.960000 --> 0:17:38.860000
 This is when Richmond comes into play.

0:17:38.860000 --> 0:17:42.260000
 So, think of internal block lists
 or threat intelligence feeds.

0:17:42.260000 --> 0:17:48.540000
 And the goal here is to identify real
 threats quickly through enrichment

0:17:48.540000 --> 0:17:50.380000
 and discard the false positives.

0:17:50.380000 --> 0:18:01.000000
 So, this is when I referenced over
 here the use of value of enrichment

0:18:01.000000 --> 0:18:05.000000
 for an hands decision make and
 I mentioned triage accuracy.

0:18:05.000000 --> 0:18:10.620000
 That's what I mean there with regards
 to the key responsibilities of tier

0:18:10.620000 --> 0:18:14.860000
 one analyst with regard to IOC handling.

0:18:14.860000 --> 0:18:19.220000
 In addition to that, they
 also responsible.

0:18:19.220000 --> 0:18:20.920000
 This is not always the case.

0:18:20.920000 --> 0:18:27.720000
 It varies by organization in terms of
 the degree or the extent to which

0:18:27.720000 --> 0:18:31.160000
 this is done. And that is
 basic IOC enrichment.

0:18:31.160000 --> 0:18:36.100000
 So, tier one analysts perform lightweight
 research to add context to the

0:18:36.100000 --> 0:18:41.700000
 IOCs. Now, you're starting to understand
 contextual enrichment as a technique

0:18:41.700000 --> 0:18:44.700000
 when we're talking about
 IOC enrichment early on.

0:18:44.700000 --> 0:18:49.300000
 In any case, this would involve the
 use of virus total to check a file

0:18:49.300000 --> 0:18:53.360000
 hash or URL and see if it's flagged
 by antivirus vendors as malicious

0:18:53.360000 --> 0:18:59.120000
 to look up GYP data to identify
 suspicious IP origins.

0:18:59.120000 --> 0:19:01.860000
 Like, for example, a login from
 North Korea deadringer.

0:19:01.860000 --> 0:19:07.700000
 That's definitely something that should
 be causing, you know, should be

0:19:07.700000 --> 0:19:12.500000
 escalated. Another would be, you know, using
 who is to check domain registration

0:19:12.500000 --> 0:19:16.920000
 info. For example, newly registered
 or anonymized domains.

0:19:16.920000 --> 0:19:23.740000
 And this enrichment, you know, basic IOC
 enrichment helps answer the question,

0:19:23.740000 --> 0:19:27.720000
 is this IOC really malicious
 or is it just unusual?

0:19:27.720000 --> 0:19:31.780000
 And that's a very, very important point
 because what you would consider

0:19:31.780000 --> 0:19:37.260000
 or a SOC tier one analyst would consider,
 you know, they would typically

0:19:37.260000 --> 0:19:41.600000
 consider something either
 malicious or unusual.

0:19:41.600000 --> 0:19:46.740000
 Now, of course, this type of enrichment,
 basic enrichment will help you

0:19:46.740000 --> 0:19:48.040000
 answer that question.

0:19:48.040000 --> 0:19:51.120000
 It'll tell you whether it's really
 malicious and whether it should be

0:19:51.120000 --> 0:19:58.000000
 investigated further by the instant responder
 or it's just unusual, right?

0:19:58.000000 --> 0:20:03.220000
 So if you perform, you know, GYP lookups
 and you see, it's not really,

0:20:03.220000 --> 0:20:08.700000
 the IP address is not from a suspicion
 suspicious region, geographical

0:20:08.700000 --> 0:20:16.760000
 region. OK, so it looks from, let's say,
 North America or Europe and doesn't

0:20:16.760000 --> 0:20:18.280000
 really look suspicious.

0:20:18.280000 --> 0:20:23.940000
 If in the case of a domain, let's say
 it was registered one year ago and

0:20:23.940000 --> 0:20:27.680000
 it's for, you know, when you visit the
 website, it looks like a legitimate

0:20:27.680000 --> 0:20:31.360000
 startup, you know, the legitimate
 website for a startup.

0:20:31.360000 --> 0:20:36.820000
 It starts moving from something that
 looked very suspicious or malicious

0:20:36.820000 --> 0:20:38.820000
 to something that just looks unusual.

0:20:38.820000 --> 0:20:42.580000
 And that doesn't mean it doesn't
 warrant further investigation.

0:20:42.580000 --> 0:20:50.220000
 Basic IUC enrichment just it just assists
 the tier one analyst in that

0:20:50.220000 --> 0:20:57.220000
 understanding the actual validity of
 an IUC with regards to whether or

0:20:57.220000 --> 0:21:01.320000
 not it is malicious or requires
 further analysis.

0:21:01.320000 --> 0:21:07.680000
 And then we also have escalation decision,
 the escalation decision making.

0:21:07.680000 --> 0:21:12.580000
 So based on the analysis and enrichment
 already performed, tier one analysts

0:21:12.580000 --> 0:21:16.880000
 decide whether to escalate to tier
 two or the instant responder or the

0:21:16.880000 --> 0:21:21.780000
 instant response team for deep investigation
 to close the alert if it's

0:21:21.780000 --> 0:21:25.960000
 a false positive or non malicious and
 not have you do the IUC enrichment

0:21:25.960000 --> 0:21:27.760000
 as the instant responder.

0:21:27.760000 --> 0:21:32.460000
 That's not to say that you can't or you
 you can't validate the IUC enrichment

0:21:32.460000 --> 0:21:34.240000
 that was performed.

0:21:34.240000 --> 0:21:40.220000
 It just means that ideally the tier
 one analyst should be performing IUC

0:21:40.220000 --> 0:21:45.300000
 enrichment for the purpose of understanding
 whether or not something really

0:21:45.300000 --> 0:21:47.020000
 is malicious or not.

0:21:47.020000 --> 0:21:51.680000
 Now of course they can't arrive at that
 determination 100% of the time.

0:21:51.680000 --> 0:21:57.000000
 And in cases where additional investigation
 is warranted, then definitely

0:21:57.000000 --> 0:22:01.700000
 tier one analyst should not
 hesitate in escalating it.

0:22:01.700000 --> 0:22:06.160000
 And of course you would also put it
 through the escalation criteria to

0:22:06.160000 --> 0:22:12.560000
 see whether this type of IUC has been
 part of other false positives.

0:22:12.560000 --> 0:22:15.560000
 If it hasn't, then it's probably something
 that should be investigated.

0:22:15.560000 --> 0:22:20.460000
 So you can see all of this is
 sort of tied is tied together.

0:22:20.460000 --> 0:22:25.140000
 In any case, finally decisions are based
 on evidence context and standard

0:22:25.140000 --> 0:22:30.780000
 operating procedures, which is again something
 that should be fairly obvious.

0:22:30.780000 --> 0:22:31.920000
 All right, so moving on.

0:22:31.920000 --> 0:22:36.660000
 What is now what are the responsibilities
 in IUC handling with regard

0:22:36.660000 --> 0:22:41.740000
 to tier two sock analysts
 or incident responders?

0:22:41.740000 --> 0:22:46.660000
 So firstly, incident responders operate
 at a deeper investigative layer

0:22:46.660000 --> 0:22:54.680000
 in the SOC assuming that we're using
 the model where a SOC comprises of

0:22:54.680000 --> 0:22:56.460000
 the tier one analyst and
 a tier two analyst.

0:22:56.460000 --> 0:22:58.700000
 Who is defined as an incident responder.

0:22:58.700000 --> 0:23:03.420000
 There may be other cases where there's
 a SOC and a separate siloed incident

0:23:03.420000 --> 0:23:07.900000
 response team that's just responsible
 for instant response, right?

0:23:07.900000 --> 0:23:12.700000
 But the bottom line is that instant responders,
 as you already know, operated

0:23:12.700000 --> 0:23:15.000000
 a deeper investigative layer.

0:23:15.000000 --> 0:23:18.880000
 And when tier one or two analysts escalate
 an alert, the incident responders,

0:23:18.880000 --> 0:23:22.600000
 you know, depending on how a SOC is
 structured, a tier two analyst may

0:23:22.600000 --> 0:23:26.260000
 not be an incident responder, although
 in most cases, they are considered

0:23:26.260000 --> 0:23:27.700000
 an incident responder.

0:23:27.700000 --> 0:23:31.460000
 But the bottom line is let's say when
 a tier one analyst escalates an

0:23:31.460000 --> 0:23:36.400000
 alert, the incident responder or responders
 step in to determine the full

0:23:36.400000 --> 0:23:40.020000
 scope of the threat, contain it and
 enhance future detection often using

0:23:40.020000 --> 0:23:47.620000
 advanced IOC, I wouldn't say IOC techniques,
 IOC enrichment techniques.

0:23:47.620000 --> 0:23:54.640000
 So let's talk or let's take a look at
 some of what an incident responder

0:23:54.640000 --> 0:23:57.700000
 would be doing with regard
 to IOC handling.

0:23:57.700000 --> 0:24:01.060000
 So firstly, we have advanced
 IOC correlation and pivoting.

0:24:01.060000 --> 0:24:04.540000
 So we have concepts like link
 analysis and pivoting.

0:24:04.540000 --> 0:24:07.580000
 So when we talk about link analysis,
 what does this mean?

0:24:07.580000 --> 0:24:12.080000
 This is where the instant responder is
 mapping connections between domains,

0:24:12.080000 --> 0:24:17.260000
 IPs and hashes to uncover infrastructure
 or attacker behavior patterns.

0:24:17.260000 --> 0:24:26.260000
 So they're sort of going a step further
 than the to sort of improve or

0:24:26.260000 --> 0:24:35.020000
 further enrich the IOCs or to correlate
 the IOCs that the IOC enrichment

0:24:35.020000 --> 0:24:46.120000
 done by the tier one analysts, they're
 now or augmented IOC analysis for

0:24:46.120000 --> 0:24:53.000000
 the goal of link analysis, which is
 really correlation for all intents

0:24:53.000000 --> 0:24:57.900000
 and purposes. But then we have pivoting,
 which is quite common where you

0:24:57.900000 --> 0:25:03.640000
 start from a known IOC like a file hash
 and then you search across systems

0:25:03.640000 --> 0:25:10.700000
 to identify. So let's say you have a
 known IOC, no matter whether it was

0:25:10.700000 --> 0:25:15.940000
 given to you by the OITO's escalated
 to in the form of a case by the tier

0:25:15.940000 --> 0:25:19.460000
 one analyst or it's something that you're
 doing under the guise of threat

0:25:19.460000 --> 0:25:24.280000
 hunting, what you can then do or what
 incident responders usually do to

0:25:24.280000 --> 0:25:30.540000
 identify the scope of the, you know,
 to identify scope in the event, you

0:25:30.540000 --> 0:25:37.580000
 know, this IOC was actually detected
 within the environment, you know,

0:25:37.580000 --> 0:25:44.460000
 to identify the scope by, you know,
 essentially searching using that IOC

0:25:44.460000 --> 0:25:48.760000
 in this case, like a file ash searching
 across multiple systems to identify

0:25:48.760000 --> 0:25:55.260000
 whether additional systems were infected,
 identify, you know, activity

0:25:55.260000 --> 0:25:59.080000
 like lateral movement and of course,
 commanded controlled relationships.

0:25:59.080000 --> 0:26:03.280000
 And the key point here is that this
 helps instant responders uncover the

0:26:03.280000 --> 0:26:08.960000
 full kill chain and eliminate
 blind spots.

0:26:08.960000 --> 0:26:13.140000
 You also have the use of threat hunting
 platforms and malware sandboxes.

0:26:13.140000 --> 0:26:18.420000
 So in the case of threat hunting platforms,
 these allow proactive search

0:26:18.420000 --> 0:26:23.020000
 for threats across large data sets using
 behavioral logic and IOC matching.

0:26:23.020000 --> 0:26:27.020000
 In the case of malware sandboxes, instant
 responders, you know, typically

0:26:27.020000 --> 0:26:30.740000
 execute suspicious files in isolated
 environments to observe behaviors.

0:26:30.740000 --> 0:26:35.100000
 And this is the key point extract secondary
 IOCs and validate payload

0:26:35.100000 --> 0:26:42.620000
 functionality. So again, answering your
 question about what you are responsible

0:26:42.620000 --> 0:26:47.060000
 for doing or what you should know with
 regards to IOC handling as an instant

0:26:47.060000 --> 0:26:53.960000
 responder, this I'm sort of outlining
 where they come into play and the

0:26:53.960000 --> 0:26:59.740000
 additional enrichment that you will be
 performing in this case, you know,

0:26:59.740000 --> 0:27:03.520000
 in the case of malware sandboxing or
 malware analysis, extracting things

0:27:03.520000 --> 0:27:07.880000
 like secondary IOCs and validating
 payload functionality.

0:27:07.880000 --> 0:27:12.520000
 But then more importantly, what your I wouldn't
 say 100% going to be responsible

0:27:12.520000 --> 0:27:16.680000
 for doing, it all, you know, depends
 on how the organization is set up

0:27:16.680000 --> 0:27:19.160000
 is generating new IOCs.

0:27:19.160000 --> 0:27:26.880000
 So from investigations, instant responders
 will often discover new IOCs

0:27:26.880000 --> 0:27:33.820000
 such as additional domains hashes or
 URLs used in the campaign, behavioral

0:27:33.820000 --> 0:27:42.340000
 indicators like specific registry changes
 or process trees and infrastructure

0:27:42.340000 --> 0:27:46.760000
 reuse patterns. And then these are
 then fed back into detection logic.

0:27:46.760000 --> 0:27:51.960000
 So think of, you know, examples would
 be seam rules, EDR alerts, firewall

0:27:51.960000 --> 0:27:55.180000
 blocks, etc. They're shared with
 threat intelligence teams.

0:27:55.180000 --> 0:27:59.700000
 If there is a threat intelligence team
 or the SOC team, you know, detection

0:27:59.700000 --> 0:28:05.200000
 engineering team in order to enrich
 organization wide defenses.

0:28:05.200000 --> 0:28:10.420000
 And these are then also used to fine tune
 alerting and reduce false positives

0:28:10.420000 --> 0:28:15.340000
 in the future. So hopefully
 that answered your question.

0:28:15.340000 --> 0:28:22.200000
 And now that you sort of understand
 the, you know, what IOCs are, the

0:28:22.200000 --> 0:28:27.520000
 identification process, which we took
 a look at in a practical sense early

0:28:27.520000 --> 0:28:30.480000
 on in this course, when we're using elk.

0:28:30.480000 --> 0:28:35.340000
 And now we've taken a look at the IOC
 analysis and enrichment process,

0:28:35.340000 --> 0:28:40.720000
 as well as what you are responsible
 for doing or what your involvement

0:28:40.720000 --> 0:28:44.380000
 will be with regard to IOCs.

0:28:44.380000 --> 0:28:50.800000
 That brings us to the end, the formally
 the end of the triage and escalation

0:28:50.800000 --> 0:28:57.820000
 section of this course, which now means
 we get to the real stuff, which

0:28:57.820000 --> 0:29:00.800000
 is what you are going to
 be responsible for doing.

0:29:00.800000 --> 0:29:07.480000
 Or we're now getting to the point where
 the SOC tier one analyst reaches

0:29:07.480000 --> 0:29:12.560000
 out to you or escalates an incident
 to you, the instant responder for

0:29:12.560000 --> 0:29:17.760000
 analysis and depending on your rules
 and responsibilities, containment,

0:29:17.760000 --> 0:29:22.800000
 eradication, recovery is something that's
 usually done or handled by the

0:29:22.800000 --> 0:29:26.580000
 infrastructure teams for obvious reasons.


0:29:26.580000 --> 0:29:30.120000
 But with that being said, that's
 going to be it for this video.

0:29:30.120000 --> 0:29:32.260000
 And I will be seeing you
 in the next video.

