1 Introduction
This user guide contains general information about the hardening processes, and helps to understand the purpose of product hardening. The document gives an overview of the hardening activities that are performed during the product development, and defines hardening activities that need to be performed during and after the installation.
The first and one of the most important step of hardening is to understand the security risks threatening the system. Therefore these threats, the probability of them happening, and the impact on the Cloud Execution Environment (CEE) must be identified. Based of the likelihood and impact, the risk of the vulnerabilities are determined. If some risks are assessed as non-acceptable, controls must be applied to mitigate those risks. This document collects the available controls to mitigate the risk.
Hardening is not an optional feature or function. Assessment of the security risks in an operational environment must
be performed according to the ISO 27011 standard, refer to Section
4.2.4.2 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4]. If the result of the
assessment contains some acceptable risks, the corresponding control
mitigating the non-important risk may not be applied, refer to Section
4.2.4.3 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4]. The owner or the responsible
of the CEE must assess the risks to have clear responsibility and
accountability, refer to Section 6.1.1 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4].
Use the CEE Hardening Checklist to collect the
result of the assessment and based on that perform the required steps.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to describe the hardening procedures and available controls of CEE.
1.2 Scope
This user guide provides a high level overview of CEE security, enumerates the hardening areas, provides detailed background information about the required hardening steps and the commands to perform them.
ScaleIO, Extreme switches, Software Defined Networking (SDN), and the Data Center Firewall (DC-FW) are mentioned in the below sections for completeness, but their hardening procedures are out of the scope of this document.
1.3 Target Groups
This document is primarily intended to be used by the staff responsible for CEE. This includes operational personnel performing installing, updating, or maintaining activities. Furthermore, security administrators managing security and IT and Telecom (security) operational managers responsible for Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) according to section 6.1.1 in the ISO 27011 standard, Reference [4] and section 6.1.1 b) in ISO 27002 standard, Reference [3].
1.4 Prerequisites
This section states the prerequisites that have to be fulfilled.
1.4.1 Required Competence
The following sections describe the required competencies for operational personnel and decision makers.
1.4.1.1 Operational Personnel
It is required for operational personnel, performing the installing, updating, or maintaining activities to understand the security concepts before handling security. For that reason, the intended audience of the document must be skilled in security and have at least CISSP certificates or equivalent. Furthermore, deep domain knowledge on cloud and security is required, especially on those components on which the hardening steps are to be performed. The security topics are, for example, cryptography, secure protocols (IPSec, TLS, SSH, and so on), security architecture, security operations management, firewall configuration, key management, security log analysis, user management, web server security, certificate management, OpenStack, Linux, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
1.4.1.2 Decision Makers
It is required for the decision makers, who identify operational risks and decide required controls, such as security administrators managing security and IT, and Telecom (security) operational managers responsible for ISMSs, that they understand the security concepts before taking responsibility and making decisions. At least CISSP, CISM, and ISO27001 lead auditor certificates or equivalent are required. Furthermore, deep domain knowledge on cloud and security is required, especially on those components on which the hardening steps are to be performed. The security topics are, for example, cryptography, secure protocols (IPSec, TLS, SSH, and so on), security architecture, security operations management, firewall configuration, key management, security log analysis, user management, web server security, certificate management, OpenStack, Linux, LDAP and SNMP protocols.
1.4.2 Documents
Ensure that the following documents have been read:
- CEE Hardening Checklist
- Security User Guide
- Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide
- DC Firewall Hardening Guide
2 General
The following sections give a general overview of the system from a security point of view and define the main hardening areas.
2.1 System Overview
An overview of the security services is shown in fig_current_sec_solutioneps Figure 1.
For an overview of the system, refer to CEE Technical Description.
For an overview of the DC-FW solution, refer to DC Firewall Hardening Guide.
2.2 Hardening Areas
The following hardening areas are defined:
| Identity and Access Management | Credentials management includes the handling of infrastructure and OpenStack credentials, and the adherence to the password policies. | |
| Prehardening of System Components | The prehardening of the system components ensures that only the required services are enabled on the Atlas management node, the compute hosts, the virtual Cloud Infrastructure Controller (vCIC) hosts, ScaleIO distributed storage, Extreme switches, and on the vFuel node. | |
| Allowed Traffic Flows Through the DC Firewall between Security Domains | The configuration of the DC-FW is defined in a way to enable only the allowed traffic flows between the various Security Domains (SDs). | |
| Certificate Management for the Northbound Interface | Managing the certificates for the northbound interface. | |
2.3 Access Control
AppArmor is a Linux Security Module (LSM) implementation used by default on Ubuntu hosts. It allows more granular access to resources than the traditional file-system Access Control Lists (ACLs). In CEE 6 the libvirt-bin AppArmor profile is updated on compute nodes to allow accessing hugepages, otherwise AppArmor configuration in CEE 6 is identical to Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
The current AppArmor status can be checked with the command aa-status.
3 Hardening Activities
This section presents the various hardening activities that take place before, during, and after the installation and integration.
- Note:
- If any of these hardening activities are not performed, the security of the system is degraded.
3.1 Hardening Before Installation and Integration
This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed before the installation and integration of the system.
3.1.1 Initial System and User Accounts
The initial administrator and system account credentials that are created during the system installation are shown in Table 1.
- Note:
- SDN users are not included in Table 1. For information about these users, refer to the SDN document Cloud SDN Hardening Guideline, Reference [2].
For more information about initial passwords, refer to the following sections of the Configuration File Guide:
- Generated and Prefilled Passwords
- IdAM
- Zabbix CEE User
- Shelf and Blade Management
- SDN Integration on HDS
|
Username |
Where |
Type |
Initial Password and Public Key Set |
Password Access Allowed (1) |
Place of Use |
Allowed Human Interface |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ceeadm |
Linux |
Initial factory password; initial public key is generated at installation time |
Yes |
Initial non-root administrator account for example for creating LDAP administrators or accounts. Disable after admin users are created |
SSH, console access | |
|
ceebackup |
Linux |
Initial factory password; initial public key is generated at installation time |
Yes |
Backup and restore processes |
SSH, console access | |
|
ceecore |
Linux |
Initial password for login locked by default, initial public key is generated at installation time Public key access from vCIC to vCICs and compute |
No |
Service account for crash and core management, not for login |
System account, not for human operation | |
|
cmha |
Linux |
Initial password for login locked by default, initial public key is generated at installation time |
No |
System account, not for login |
System account, not for human operation | |
|
Service user accounts, for example nova; bin in /etc/shadow |
Linux |
No passwords, some of them have public keys if communication is required |
No |
Running system daemons, system account, not used for login |
System accounts, not for human operation | |
|
root |
Linux |
Initial factory password, password based login must be disabled after install. Root account public key access from vFuel to vCIC and compute |
Yes |
In operation system account to manage vCIC, compute, and vFuel |
SSH, console access at bootstrap | |
|
root |
vCIC, compute |
Linux |
Initial factory password, public key based login available only from vFuel |
Yes, but console only access (no SSH) |
Mainly system account for vFuel to manage vCIC and compute Console access for recovery |
Console access for password, no SSH (for recovery) |
|
root |
Atlas VM |
Linux |
No public key based authentication |
No |
System account, not for login |
System account, not for human operation |
|
atlasadm |
Atlas VM |
Linux |
Initial password to log in to Atlas, no public key based authentication by default |
Yes |
Initial account in Atlas VM |
|
|
admin |
OpenStack (vCIC, host, Atlas) |
OpenStack |
Initial factory passwords, no public keys |
Yes |
OpenStack management |
Atlas dashboard, OpenStack CLI (RESTful interfaces) |
|
Service accounts within OpenStack |
OpenStack (vCIC, compute) |
OpenStack |
Randomly generated passwords during installation |
No |
System accounts |
System accounts, not for human operation |
|
User accounts in LDAP |
Compute |
No, but can be configured; password complexity can be applied |
Yes |
Operating system |
||
|
zabbix_cee_user |
Zabbix API, OpenStack |
OpenStack |
User and password can be set |
Read-only user in Zabbix to read the GUI |
GUI, RO | |
|
OpenStack cloud administrators |
OpenStack |
None, no password complexity in OpenStack Mitaka release |
Yes, to OpenStack |
OpenStack management |
OpenStack API | |
|
OpenStack cloud users |
OpenStack |
None, no password complexity in OpenStack Mitaka release |
Yes, to OpenStack |
OpenStack limited management |
OpenStack API | |
|
admin |
ScaleIO MDM |
ScaleIO |
Password |
Yes |
ScaleIO management |
|
|
Gateway admin user |
ScaleIO GW |
ScaleIO |
Password |
Yes |
ScaleIO management |
|
|
Frontend configurator user for Cinder |
ScaleIO MDM |
ScaleIO |
Password |
No |
||
|
BSP users |
HW |
Refer to BSP documentation, password |
Yes |
|||
|
HDS users |
HW |
Refer to HDS documentation |
||||
|
admin |
Extreme |
HW |
SSH password, SOAP service |
Yes |
SSH, SOAP |
(1) The value of this field is "Yes" in case it is a human access account. The value is "No", if it is a system account.
- Note:
- All these credentials are mandatory for the system to function correctly.
There are different kind of credentials in the system for machine to machine and for human intended usage. All machine to machine passwords are updated or randomly generated during the time of the deployment in order to avoid well-known passwords that would cause privilege escalation and security issues.
For more information about user and password management, refer to Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide.
3.1.2 Prehardened System Components
The following components are subject to prehardening in the system:
3.1.2.1 Compute HW Hardening
The compute hardware equipment is prehardened by the original vendor. For more information refer to the documentation of the manufacturer.
3.1.2.2 Compute OS Hardening
The compute host uses Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and is, for most parts, prehardened.
All services that are running on the compute host after installation are required, and must not be disabled.
All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.
For a list of the compute host ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.
For the compute host, only Secure Shell (SSH) version two (SSH-2) is allowed as a network access protocol.
3.1.2.3 vCIC OS Hardening
The vCIC hosts use Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and are, for most parts, prehardened.
All services that are running on the vCIC host OS after installation are required, and must not be disabled.
All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.
For a list of the vCIC ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.
For the vCIC, only SSH-2 is allowed as a network access protocol.
3.1.2.4 Atlas OS Hardening
The Atlas host uses Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and is, for most parts, prehardened.
All services that are running on Atlas after installation are required, and must not be disabled.
All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.
For a list of the Atlas ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.
For Atlas, only SSH-2 is allowed as a network access protocol.
3.1.2.5 vFuel OS Hardening
The vFuel node uses CentOS, and is, for most parts, prehardened.
All services that are running on the vFuel node after installation are required, and must not be disabled.
For a list of the vFuel ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.
For vFuel, only Secure Shell (SSH) version two (SSH-2) is allowed as a network access protocol.
3.1.2.6 Extreme Switch Hardening
The Extreme switches are prehardened by Extreme Networks.
3.1.2.7 EMC ScaleIO Storage Hardening
- Note:
- This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage is used.
If CEE is installed with a managed ScaleIO storage solution, the ScaleIO solution is prehardened by EMC. For more information, refer to ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7].
3.2 Hardening During Installation and Integration
This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed during the installation and integration.
For more information about user configuration, refer to the following documents:
- Sections IdAM and LDAP Users in the Configuration File Guide
- SDN document Cloud SDN Hardening Guideline, Reference [2]
3.2.1 Initial Administrator Credentials
The initial credentials for all of the predefined local administrators are configured in config.yaml during the system installation. The default passwords for the following human access accounts must be changed before installing the system, or immediately after the system deployment:
- ceeadm, for more information, see Section 3.3.5.
- ceebackup, for more information, see Section 3.3.5.
- root user for vFuel, for more information, see Section 3.3.5.
- root user for vCIC host and compute host, for more information, see Section 3.3.3.
- atlasadm, for more information, see Section 3.3.4.
- admin, for more information, see Section 3.3.7.
For detailed instructions on how to manage administrator passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide.
3.2.2 DC-FW Configuration
In the current system, the DC-FW is located outside the Cloud Execution Environment (CEE).
The DC-FW provides protection for the system, and also acts as an O&M firewall.
The DC-FW is used to enforce access control between SDs.
In the DC-FW two logical firewall instance types can be defined, one is responsible for controlling the CEE management traffic, another is responsible for the protection of the tenant.
The SDs, and their relations are shown in fig_security_domainseps Figure 1. The O&M-FW is a logical instance in the DC-FW. Tenant firewall is another logical instance in the DC-FW, that protects the data center from external attacks, by performing basic screening of tenant traffic.
Settings of the tenant firewall is out of the scope of this document, as the exact settings depend on the security expectations of the tenant. The tenant traffic must not be mixed with the O&M traffic.
At the perimeter of CEE, a Data Center Gateway (DC-GW) and DC-FW protects the internals of the CEE. For more information refer to the DC Firewall Hardening Guide.
For the logical configuration of the O&M-FW during the installation (grouped by outbound direction), use Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 as references.
|
Source |
Destination |
Service | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Security Domain |
Address |
Port |
Security |
Address |
Port |
Proto |
Application |
Information | ||
|
Admin clients |
Any |
Cloud management domain |
CIC northbound public IP |
443 |
Zabbix vHost | |||||
|
Admin clients |
Any |
Cloud |
Atlas northbound |
443 |
Atlas | |||||
|
Admin clients |
Any |
CIC/infra |
CIC northbound |
5900: |
VNC | |||||
|
Admin/browser |
Any |
CIC/infra |
CIC northbound |
8774 |
Nova | |||||
|
8775 |
Nova | |||||||||
|
8776 |
Cinder | |||||||||
|
6080 |
Nova | |||||||||
|
Admin clients |
Any |
Cloud management domain |
CIC northbound public IP |
6611 |
ScaleIO GUI | |||||
|
Source |
Destination |
Service | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Security Domain |
Address |
Port |
Security Domain |
Address |
Port |
Proto |
Application |
Information | ||
|
Cloud |
Atlas |
Any |
CIC/infra |
CIC northbound |
22 |
|||||
|
Cloud |
Admin/browser |
Any |
CIC/infra |
CIC northbound |
6080 |
OpenStack VNC support | ||||
|
Cloud |
Cloud |
Any |
CIC/infra |
CIC HAProxy |
5000 |
Keystone-1 | ||||
|
6080 |
Nova-novncproxy | |||||||||
|
8052 |
Watchmen | |||||||||
|
8054 |
Watchmen | |||||||||
|
8080 |
Swift | |||||||||
|
8774 |
Nova | |||||||||
|
8776 |
Cinder | |||||||||
|
8777 |
Ceilometer | |||||||||
|
9292 |
Glance | |||||||||
|
9494 |
Glance | |||||||||
|
9696 |
Neutron | |||||||||
|
35357 |
Keystone-2 | |||||||||
|
30165 |
Watchmen | |||||||||
|
Cloud |
Browser/Client |
Any |
Cloud |
Atlas southbound |
8888 |
ovtf API | ||||
|
8004 |
heat API | |||||||||
|
8003 |
heat API cloudwatch | |||||||||
|
8000 |
heat API cnf | |||||||||
|
Source |
Destination |
Service | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Security Domain |
Address |
Port |
Security Domain |
Address |
Port |
Proto |
Application |
Information |
|
CIC/infra |
Log |
Cloud |
Atlas southbound |
20514 |
Log collector in Atlas | |||
|
CIC/infra |
NMS Server |
162 |
SNMP v2 |
|||||
|
CIC/infra |
Extreme Switch |
123 |
123 |
ntp |
ntp-server in NOC time server | |||
For more information about how to set the rules in DC-FW, refer to DC Firewall Hardening Guide.
3.2.3 Authenticate NTP Server
Authenticate the upstream NTP servers as described in section NTP Authentication in the Configuration File Guide.
3.2.4 Change Legal Text Presented at Logon
To change the predefined message shown before logon attempts, update the config.yaml as described in section Legal Text Presented at Logon in the Configuration File Guide.
3.2.5 ScaleIO Management Tools
- Note:
- This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used and deployed in CEE managed mode.
ScaleIO is accessible with GUI, which must be deployed outside CEE (for example in a NOC domain) on the public_vip network, on port 6611. The EMC ScaleIO GUI requires the MDM IP address, set to the public_vip address.
Managing ScaleIO via CLI is also possible from CEE nodes that are running the ScaleIO Meta Data Manager (MDM) component.
3.2.6 Location of Logs
Logs are written to the following locations:
- vFuel logs, including rsyslogd logs and local logs, are stored under /var/log/remote/<host_name_or_ip_address>.
An example is:
[root@fuel ~]# ll /var/log/remote/
total 36
drwxr-x--- 3 root root 4096 May 9 13:39 127.0.0.1
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 22 May 9 12:18 192.168.0.20 -> compute-0-2.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 May 9 12:18 192.168.0.21 -> cinder-0-5.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 22 May 9 12:18 192.168.0.22 -> compute-0-4.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 22 May 9 12:18 192.168.0.23 -> compute-0-3.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 22 May 9 12:18 192.168.0.24 -> compute-0-6.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 May 9 12:48 192.168.0.25 -> cic-3.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 May 9 12:48 192.168.0.26 -> cic-2.domain.tld
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 May 9 12:48 192.168.0.27 -> cic-1.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 4 root root 4096 May 9 12:57 cic-1.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 4 root root 4096 May 9 12:57 cic-2.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 4 root root 4096 May 9 12:57 cic-3.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 4 root root 4096 May 9 13:02 cinder-0-5.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 5 root root 4096 May 9 12:45 compute-0-2.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 5 root root 4096 May 9 12:45 compute-0-3.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 5 root root 4096 May 9 12:45 compute-0-4.domain.tld
drwxr-x--- 5 root root 4096 May 9 13:01 compute-0-6.domain.tldIf CEE is configured to write logs to vFuel (ericsson.logging.forward_to_fuel is set to true), logs are written to vFuel even after deployment. If ericsson.logging.forward_to_fuel is set to false, only vFuel logs are written under /var/log/remote/<host_name_or_ip_address>.
- For the location of infrastructure related logs, refer to Audit and Security Logging.
- For the location of Atlas logs, refer to the Locating Files section in the Atlas Troubleshooting Guideline, Reference [1].
- In CEE deployments with tightly integrated SDN, the logging framework of SDN processes is independent from CEE. For more information on SDN logs, refer to the SDN document Logging, Reference [5].
- For the location of ScaleIO logs, refer to Audit and Security Logging.
- For the location of licensing related (NeLS) logs, refer to Audit and Security Logging.
3.3 Product Security Maintenance After Installation and Integration
This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed after the installation and integration.
3.3.1 Manage Administrator Credentials
This section describes the management of administrator credentials.
3.3.1.1 Changing Password for Predefined Administrator Credentials
The passwords for the predefined administrator credentials must be changed on a regular basis.
For the detailed procedure of managing the following predefined administrator credentials, and for the procedure of changing the passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide:
- root user for vCIC host and compute host, for more information see Section 3.3.3.
- atlasadm, for more information see Section 3.3.4.
- ceeadm, for more information see Section 3.3.5.
- ceebackup, for more information see Section 3.3.5.
- root user for vFuel, for more information see Section 3.3.5.
- grub user, for more information see Section 3.3.6.
- admin, for more information see Section 3.3.7.
The passwords must fulfill the strong password conditions. For the strong password conditions, see Section 4, or refer to your local company policy for defining strong passwords.
3.3.1.2 Changing Password for Operator Defined Administrator Credentials
It is strongly advised to regularly change the administrator passwords of the credentials that are defined by the operator in the system.
For detailed instructions on how to manage administrator passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide.
3.3.1.3 Creating Additional Credentials
During the first startup of the system, only the default administrator credentials are available. In addition to those credentials, each system administrator must use individual personal user accounts when logging in. The use of shared accounts is not recommended. For the vCIC hosts, the compute host, the storage solution, and for the Extreme switches, individual user accounts are provisioned in the LDAP server. For Atlas, user accounts are local.
For more information about credentials management, refer to Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide.
3.3.2 Change Certificates on vFuel
3.3.2.1 Change Cobbler Certificate
To change the Cobbler certificate on vFuel, perform the following steps:
- Acquire the new certificate and key in pem x509 format with the necessary characteristics (for example, using OpenSSL).
- Create a backup of the current certificate and key. The location of the certificate and the key are listed in /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf.
- Copy the new certificate (cobbler.crt) and key (cobbler.key) to the /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/cobbler/ directory on vFuel.
- Restart the Apache and Cobbler services:
systemctl restart httpd.service systemctl restart cobblerd.service
- Check the availability of the Cobbler Web UI at https://<VFUEL_IP_ADDRESS>/cobbler_web.
3.3.2.2 Change Fuel Web GUI Certificate
- Acquire the new certificate and key in pem x509 format with the necessary characteristics (for example, using OpenSSL).
- Create a backup of the current certificate and key on vFuel. The location of the certificate and the key are listed in /etc/nginx/conf.d/services.conf. The location is by default /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/nginx/.
- Copy the new certificate (nginx.crt) and key (nginx.key) to the /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/nginx/ directory on vFuel.
- Restart the Apache and Nginx services:
systemctl restart httpd.service systemctl restart nginx.service
- Check the availability of the Fuel Web UI at https://<VFUEL_IP_ADDRESS>:8443.
3.3.3 vCIC Host OS Hardening
After the installation, the root password must be changed. For the procedure of changing the root password, refer to the documents SW Installation in Multi-Server Deployment and SW Installation in Single Server Deployment.
The root access with a password to vCIC host is disabled by default, and only administrator accounts defined in the LDAP can be used for login.
The ceeadm account is not to be used for direct login after the administrator accounts in LDAP have been created.
3.3.4 Atlas User Management
For Atlas, user accounts are local. The initial system user, atlasadm, with sudo rights is created during the prehardening. The password of the atlasadm is set during the installation procedure.
For more information refer to Atlas SW Installation.
3.3.5 vFuel User Management
After the initial installation, only the root user exists in the vFuel server. The CEE deployment adds the ceeadm, cmha, and ceebackup users to the vFuel server.
It is possible to use the ceeadm user to access the vFuel server for creating the initial personal accounts. After that, the ceeadm user must only be used by infrastructure components, and during update and rollback.
It is recommended to create additional local Linux user accounts to the vFuel server for personnel administering the system.
It is possible to disable predefined users after the access is available with additional users, with the following command:
usermod -e 1 <username>
It is possible that root access is required during system update and expansion. In such cases, the root account must be enabled with the following command:
usermod -e "" root
Once the activities that require the root access have been completed, it is recommended to lock the account again.
The passwords for all vFuel administrators must be changed by using the passwd command on a regular basis.
It is possible to configure users with password expiry. Enter passwd -? for the available options.
3.3.6 GRUB User Management
After the successful deployment of the system, it is recommended to change the password for the Grand Unified Bootloader (GRUB) user, as described in section Change GRUB Password in the Runtime Configuration Guide.
For more information about the initial configuration of the GRUB password, used for CEE installation, refer to section GRUB Configuration in the Configuration File Guide.
3.3.7 Extreme Switch User Management
The Extreme switch default user account is defined as admin without a password defined. After the successful deployment of the system, it is recommended to change the password for the local admin user in the Extreme switch.
By default, CEE installation creates a user defined in the config.yaml system configuration, which is used by system components, such as OpenStack Neutron, for accessing and configuring the switch. This user must not be modified at runtime.
For managing the local switch accounts, refer to the Extreme EXOS documentation.
3.3.8 ScaleIO Access Control
- Note:
- This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used.
Change the initial passwords as described in the "Access Control Settings" section of the ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7]. After changing the passwords, update the config.yaml with the new passwords. This is needed because ScaleIO administrator users are not managed by the Identity and Access Management (IdAM).
3.3.9 NeLS Access Control
Change the initial passwords as described in the NeLS document NeLS Security User Guide, Reference [6]. For more information and possible restrictions, refer to the Configuration File Guide.
3.3.10 Managing TLS Certificates in CEE
For more information on the necessary certificates and the tasks to perform before installation, refer to the CA and NBI Certificates for Secure HTTPS Access section of the documents SW Installation in Multi-Server Deployment and SW Installation in Single Server Deployment. To configure a secure NBI connection, refer to section Secure NBI API Endpoints in the Configuration File Guide.
3.3.10.1 Certificates for ScaleIO
- Note:
- This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used.
Ensure that TLS certificates are available. For more information, refer to the "Communication Security Settings" section of the ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7].
3.3.11 CEE Infrastructure Network Hardening for SDN Tight Integration
The procedure described in this section serves to prevent Neutron from selecting VNIs used by HDS for infrastructure connectivity through the L3 fabric, by creating separate Neutron networks for the infrastructure networks. Perform the following steps:
- Log on to a vCIC as admin.
- Create an infrastructure project:
openstack project create <project_name>
Example output:
root@cic-1:~# openstack project create cee_infra +-------------+----------------------------------+ | Field | Value | +-------------+----------------------------------+ | description | None | | enabled | True | | id | 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69 | | name | cee_infra | +-------------+----------------------------------+
- Note:
- Make a note of the UUID shown in the id field, as it will be required later.
- Identify the VNIs used by the CEE infrastructure networks using the HDS CCM.
- For each VNI, create a Neutron network assigned to the
UUID of the infrastructure project, with vxlan network type, using the VNI as segmentation_id.
neutron net-create --tenant-id <project_UUID> ⇒
--provider:network_type vxlan --provider:segmentation_id <network_VNI> <network_name>neutron net-create --tenant-id <project_UUID> --provider:network_type vxlan ⇒
--provider:segmentation_id <network_VNI> <network_name>- Note:
- The UUID can be retrieved using openstack project list.
For example:
Example 1 Neutron Network Creation for Infrastructure VNI
root@cic-1:~# neutron net-create --tenant-id 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69 ⇒ --provider:network_type vxlan --provider:segmentation_id 4098 cee_om_sp_1_forvlan201_cee1 Created a new network: +---------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Field | Value | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | admin_state_up | True | | availability_zone_hints | | | availability_zones | | | created_at | 2018-03-22T09:01:39 | | description | | | id | c342a213-5cbe-4c65-8fac-b51a22e0fe92 | | ipv4_address_scope | | | ipv6_address_scope | | | mtu | 1450 | | name | cee_om_sp_1_forvlan201_cee1 | | port_security_enabled | True | | provider:network_type | vxlan | | provider:physical_network | | | provider:segmentation_id | 4098 | | router:external | False | | shared | False | | status | ACTIVE | | subnets | | | tags | | | tenant_id | 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69 | | updated_at | 2018-03-22T09:01:39 | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
4 Strong Password Conditions
In order to set a strong password, the following conditions must be met:
- The length of the password must be at least 12 characters.
- The password must contain the following:
- At least one lower-case alphabetic character
- At least one upper-case alphabetic character
- At least one numeric character
- At least one special character
- The password must not contain more than three consecutive instances of the same character class.
- Real names or words must not be used.
- The password must not be the same as the user name.
Reference List
| [1] Atlas Troubleshooting Guideline, 6/1553-CRA 119 1873/5 Uen B |
| [2] Cloud SDN Hardening Guideline, 2/1553-AXD 101 08/6-V1 |
| [3] ISO27002: Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls ISO/IEC 27002 Second edition 2013-10-01, http://www.iso.org. |
| [4] ISO27011: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management guidelines for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002 ISO/IEC 27011 First edition 2008-12-15, http://www.iso.org. |
| [5] Logging, 3/198 22-AXD 101 08/6-V1 |
| [6] NeLS Security User Guide, 5/1553-AVA 901 45/2 |
| [7] ScaleIO® Security Configuration Guide, 2/1553-CNA 403 3308/5 |

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