System Hardening Guideline
Cloud Execution Environment

Contents

1Introduction
1.1Purpose
1.2Scope
1.3Target Groups
1.4Prerequisites
1.4.1Required Competence
1.4.2Documents

2

General
2.1System Overview
2.2Hardening Areas
2.3Access Control

3

Hardening Activities
3.1Hardening Before Installation and Integration
3.1.1Initial System and User Accounts
3.1.2Prehardened System Components
3.2Hardening During Installation and Integration
3.2.1Initial Administrator Credentials
3.2.2DC-FW Configuration
3.2.3Authenticate NTP Server
3.2.4Change Legal Text Presented at Logon
3.2.5ScaleIO Management Tools
3.2.6Location of Logs
3.3Product Security Maintenance After Installation and Integration
3.3.1Manage Administrator Credentials
3.3.2Change Certificates on vFuel
3.3.3vCIC Host OS Hardening
3.3.4Atlas User Management
3.3.5vFuel User Management
3.3.6GRUB User Management
3.3.7Extreme Switch User Management
3.3.8ScaleIO Access Control
3.3.9NeLS Access Control
3.3.10Managing TLS Certificates in CEE
3.3.11CEE Infrastructure Network Hardening for SDN Tight Integration

4

Strong Password Conditions

Reference List

1   Introduction

This user guide contains general information about the hardening processes, and helps to understand the purpose of product hardening. The document gives an overview of the hardening activities that are performed during the product development, and defines hardening activities that need to be performed during and after the installation.

The first and one of the most important step of hardening is to understand the security risks threatening the system. Therefore these threats, the probability of them happening, and the impact on the Cloud Execution Environment (CEE) must be identified. Based of the likelihood and impact, the risk of the vulnerabilities are determined. If some risks are assessed as non-acceptable, controls must be applied to mitigate those risks. This document collects the available controls to mitigate the risk.

Attention!

Hardening is not an optional feature or function. Assessment of the security risks in an operational environment must be performed according to the ISO 27011 standard, refer to Section 4.2.4.2 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4]. If the result of the assessment contains some acceptable risks, the corresponding control mitigating the non-important risk may not be applied, refer to Section 4.2.4.3 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4]. The owner or the responsible of the CEE must assess the risks to have clear responsibility and accountability, refer to Section 6.1.1 of the ISO27011 documentation, Reference [4].
Use the CEE Hardening Checklist to collect the result of the assessment and based on that perform the required steps.

For more information on how to manage information security in telecommunications organizations, refer to ISO 27011, Reference [4].

1.1   Purpose

The purpose of this document is to describe the hardening procedures and available controls of CEE.

1.2   Scope

This user guide provides a high level overview of CEE security, enumerates the hardening areas, provides detailed background information about the required hardening steps and the commands to perform them.

ScaleIO, Extreme switches, Software Defined Networking (SDN), and the Data Center Firewall (DC-FW) are mentioned in the below sections for completeness, but their hardening procedures are out of the scope of this document.

1.3   Target Groups

This document is primarily intended to be used by the staff responsible for CEE. This includes operational personnel performing installing, updating, or maintaining activities. Furthermore, security administrators managing security and IT and Telecom (security) operational managers responsible for Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) according to section 6.1.1 in the ISO 27011 standard, Reference [4] and section 6.1.1 b) in ISO 27002 standard, Reference [3].

1.4   Prerequisites

This section states the prerequisites that have to be fulfilled.

1.4.1   Required Competence

The following sections describe the required competencies for operational personnel and decision makers.

1.4.1.1   Operational Personnel

It is required for operational personnel, performing the installing, updating, or maintaining activities to understand the security concepts before handling security. For that reason, the intended audience of the document must be skilled in security and have at least CISSP certificates or equivalent. Furthermore, deep domain knowledge on cloud and security is required, especially on those components on which the hardening steps are to be performed. The security topics are, for example, cryptography, secure protocols (IPSec, TLS, SSH, and so on), security architecture, security operations management, firewall configuration, key management, security log analysis, user management, web server security, certificate management, OpenStack, Linux, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

1.4.1.2   Decision Makers

It is required for the decision makers, who identify operational risks and decide required controls, such as security administrators managing security and IT, and Telecom (security) operational managers responsible for ISMSs, that they understand the security concepts before taking responsibility and making decisions. At least CISSP, CISM, and ISO27001 lead auditor certificates or equivalent are required. Furthermore, deep domain knowledge on cloud and security is required, especially on those components on which the hardening steps are to be performed. The security topics are, for example, cryptography, secure protocols (IPSec, TLS, SSH, and so on), security architecture, security operations management, firewall configuration, key management, security log analysis, user management, web server security, certificate management, OpenStack, Linux, LDAP and SNMP protocols.

1.4.2   Documents

Ensure that the following documents have been read:

2   General

The following sections give a general overview of the system from a security point of view and define the main hardening areas.

2.1   System Overview

An overview of the security services is shown in fig_current_sec_solutioneps Figure 1.

Figure 0   Current Security Solution

Figure 1   Current Security Solution

For an overview of the system, refer to CEE Technical Description.

For an overview of the DC-FW solution, refer to DC Firewall Hardening Guide.

2.2   Hardening Areas

The following hardening areas are defined:

Identity and Access Management Credentials management includes the handling of infrastructure and OpenStack credentials, and the adherence to the password policies.
Prehardening of System Components The prehardening of the system components ensures that only the required services are enabled on the Atlas management node, the compute hosts, the virtual Cloud Infrastructure Controller (vCIC) hosts, ScaleIO distributed storage, Extreme switches, and on the vFuel node.
Allowed Traffic Flows Through the DC Firewall between Security Domains The configuration of the DC-FW is defined in a way to enable only the allowed traffic flows between the various Security Domains (SDs).
Certificate Management for the Northbound Interface Managing the certificates for the northbound interface.

2.3   Access Control

AppArmor is a Linux Security Module (LSM) implementation used by default on Ubuntu hosts. It allows more granular access to resources than the traditional file-system Access Control Lists (ACLs). In CEE 6 the libvirt-bin AppArmor profile is updated on compute nodes to allow accessing hugepages, otherwise AppArmor configuration in CEE 6 is identical to Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.

The current AppArmor status can be checked with the command aa-status.

3   Hardening Activities

This section presents the various hardening activities that take place before, during, and after the installation and integration.

Note:  
If any of these hardening activities are not performed, the security of the system is degraded.

3.1   Hardening Before Installation and Integration

This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed before the installation and integration of the system.

3.1.1   Initial System and User Accounts

The initial administrator and system account credentials that are created during the system installation are shown in Table 1.

Note:  
SDN users are not included in Table 1. For information about these users, refer to the SDN document Cloud SDN Hardening Guideline, Reference [2].

For more information about initial passwords, refer to the following sections of the Configuration File Guide:

Table 1    Initial Administrator and System Account Credentials

Username

Where

Type

Initial Password and Public Key Set

Password Access Allowed (1)

Place of Use

Allowed Human Interface

ceeadm

vCIC, compute, vFuel

Linux

Initial factory password; initial public key is generated at installation time


Public key access from vCIC to vCICs, compute, and vFuel

Yes

Initial non-root administrator account for example for creating LDAP administrators or accounts. Disable after admin users are created


Local user in vFuel, LDAP user for vCIC and compute

SSH, console access

ceebackup

vCIC, vFuel

Linux

Initial factory password; initial public key is generated at installation time


Public key access from vCIC to vCICs, compute, and vFuel

Yes

Backup and restore processes


Local user in vCIC, vFuel

SSH, console access

ceecore

vCIC

Linux

Initial password for login locked by default, initial public key is generated at installation time


Public key access from vCIC to vCICs and compute

No

Service account for crash and core management, not for login

System account, not for human operation

cmha

vCIC, compute, vFuel

Linux

Initial password for login locked by default, initial public key is generated at installation time


Public key access from vCIC to vCICs, compute, and vFuel

No

System account, not for login

System account, not for human operation

Service user accounts, for example nova; bin in /etc/shadow

vCIC, compute (nova), vFuel (no OpenStack users)

Linux

No passwords, some of them have public keys if communication is required

No

Running system daemons, system account, not used for login

System accounts, not for human operation

root

vFuel

Linux

Initial factory password, password based login must be disabled after install.


Root account public key access from vFuel to vCIC and compute

Yes

In operation system account to manage vCIC, compute, and vFuel

SSH, console access at bootstrap

root

vCIC, compute

Linux

Initial factory password, public key based login available only from vFuel

Yes, but console only access (no SSH)

Mainly system account for vFuel to manage vCIC and compute


Console access for recovery

Console access for password, no SSH (for recovery)

root

Atlas VM

Linux

No public key based authentication

No

System account, not for login

System account, not for human operation

atlasadm

Atlas VM

Linux

Initial password to log in to Atlas, no public key based authentication by default

Yes

Initial account in Atlas VM

SSH

admin

OpenStack (vCIC, host, Atlas)

OpenStack

Initial factory passwords, no public keys

Yes

OpenStack management

Atlas dashboard, OpenStack CLI (RESTful interfaces)

Service accounts within OpenStack

OpenStack (vCIC, compute)

OpenStack

Randomly generated passwords during installation

No

System accounts

System accounts, not for human operation

User accounts in LDAP

Compute

LDAP

No, but can be configured; password complexity can be applied

Yes

Operating system

SSH

zabbix_cee_user

Zabbix API, OpenStack

OpenStack

User and password can be set

 

Read-only user in Zabbix to read the GUI

GUI, RO

OpenStack cloud administrators

vCIC

OpenStack

None, no password complexity in OpenStack Mitaka release

Yes, to OpenStack

OpenStack management

OpenStack API

OpenStack cloud users

vCIC

OpenStack

None, no password complexity in OpenStack Mitaka release

Yes, to OpenStack

OpenStack limited management

OpenStack API

admin

ScaleIO MDM

ScaleIO

Password

Yes

ScaleIO management

CLI, GUI

Gateway admin user

ScaleIO GW

ScaleIO

Password

Yes

ScaleIO management

CLI

Frontend configurator user for Cinder

ScaleIO MDM

ScaleIO

Password

No

   

BSP users

BSP

HW

Refer to BSP documentation, password

Yes

 

SSH

HDS users

HDS

HW

Refer to HDS documentation

     

admin

Extreme

HW

SSH password, SOAP service

Yes

 

SSH, SOAP

(1)   The value of this field is "Yes" in case it is a human access account. The value is "No", if it is a system account.


Note:  
All these credentials are mandatory for the system to function correctly.

There are different kind of credentials in the system for machine to machine and for human intended usage. All machine to machine passwords are updated or randomly generated during the time of the deployment in order to avoid well-known passwords that would cause privilege escalation and security issues.

For more information about user and password management, refer to Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide.

3.1.2   Prehardened System Components

The following components are subject to prehardening in the system:

3.1.2.1   Compute HW Hardening

The compute hardware equipment is prehardened by the original vendor. For more information refer to the documentation of the manufacturer.

3.1.2.2   Compute OS Hardening

The compute host uses Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and is, for most parts, prehardened.

All services that are running on the compute host after installation are required, and must not be disabled.

All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.

For a list of the compute host ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.

For the compute host, only Secure Shell (SSH) version two (SSH-2) is allowed as a network access protocol.

3.1.2.3   vCIC OS Hardening

The vCIC hosts use Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and are, for most parts, prehardened.

All services that are running on the vCIC host OS after installation are required, and must not be disabled.

All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.

For a list of the vCIC ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.

For the vCIC, only SSH-2 is allowed as a network access protocol.

3.1.2.4   Atlas OS Hardening

The Atlas host uses Ubuntu 14.04 Linux, and is, for most parts, prehardened.

All services that are running on Atlas after installation are required, and must not be disabled.

All available but unnecessary services and ports have already been disabled.

For a list of the Atlas ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.

For Atlas, only SSH-2 is allowed as a network access protocol.

3.1.2.5   vFuel OS Hardening

The vFuel node uses CentOS, and is, for most parts, prehardened.

All services that are running on the vFuel node after installation are required, and must not be disabled.

For a list of the vFuel ports and services, refer to the Security User Guide.

For vFuel, only Secure Shell (SSH) version two (SSH-2) is allowed as a network access protocol.

3.1.2.6   Extreme Switch Hardening

The Extreme switches are prehardened by Extreme Networks.

3.1.2.7   EMC ScaleIO Storage Hardening

Note:  
This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage is used.

If CEE is installed with a managed ScaleIO storage solution, the ScaleIO solution is prehardened by EMC. For more information, refer to ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7].

3.2   Hardening During Installation and Integration

This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed during the installation and integration.

For more information about user configuration, refer to the following documents:

3.2.1   Initial Administrator Credentials

The initial credentials for all of the predefined local administrators are configured in config.yaml during the system installation. The default passwords for the following human access accounts must be changed before installing the system, or immediately after the system deployment:

For detailed instructions on how to manage administrator passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide.

3.2.2   DC-FW Configuration

In the current system, the DC-FW is located outside the Cloud Execution Environment (CEE).

The DC-FW provides protection for the system, and also acts as an O&M firewall.

The DC-FW is used to enforce access control between SDs.

In the DC-FW two logical firewall instance types can be defined, one is responsible for controlling the CEE management traffic, another is responsible for the protection of the tenant.

The SDs, and their relations are shown in fig_security_domainseps Figure 1. The O&M-FW is a logical instance in the DC-FW. Tenant firewall is another logical instance in the DC-FW, that protects the data center from external attacks, by performing basic screening of tenant traffic.

Settings of the tenant firewall is out of the scope of this document, as the exact settings depend on the security expectations of the tenant. The tenant traffic must not be mixed with the O&M traffic.

At the perimeter of CEE, a Data Center Gateway (DC-GW) and DC-FW protects the internals of the CEE. For more information refer to the DC Firewall Hardening Guide.

Figure 1   Security Domains

Figure 2   Security Domains

For the logical configuration of the O&M-FW during the installation (grouped by outbound direction), use Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 as references.

Table 2    Traffic Flows from NOC Domain

Source

Destination

Service

Security Domain

Address

Port

Security
Domain

Address

Port

Proto

Application

Information

NOC

Admin clients

Any

Cloud management domain

CIC northbound public IP

443

HTTPS

TLS

Zabbix vHost

NOC

Admin clients

Any

Cloud
management
domain

Atlas northbound

443

TCP

HTTPS

Atlas
Horizon service

NOC

Admin clients

Any

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC northbound
public IP

5900:
15899

TCP

HTTPS

VNC
Console Address

NOC

Admin/browser

Any

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC northbound
public IP

8774

TCP

 

Nova

8775

Nova

8776

Cinder

6080

Nova

NOC

Admin clients

Any

Cloud management domain

CIC northbound public IP

6611

TCP

TLS

ScaleIO GUI

Table 3    Traffic Flows from Cloud Management Domain

Source

Destination

Service

Security Domain

Address

Port

Security Domain

Address

Port

Proto

Application

Information

Cloud
management
domain

Atlas
Southbound

Any

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC northbound
public IP

22

TCP

SSH
SCP,
SFTP

Non-REST API access to the CIC

Cloud
management
domain

Admin/browser

Any

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC northbound
public IP

6080

TCP

HTTPS

OpenStack VNC support

Cloud
management
domain

Cloud
Management System

Any

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC HAProxy

5000

TCP

HTTPS

Keystone-1

6080

Nova-novncproxy

8052

Watchmen

8054

Watchmen

8080

Swift

   

8774

Nova

8776

HTTPS

Cinder

8777

Ceilometer

9292

Glance

9494

Glance

9696

Neutron

35357

Keystone-2

30165

UDP

SNMP

Watchmen

Cloud
management
domain

Browser/Client

Any

Cloud
management
domain

Atlas southbound

8888

TCP

HTTPS

ovtf API

8004

heat API

8003

heat API cloudwatch

8000

heat API cnf

Table 4    Traffic Flows from CIC/Infra Management Domain

Source

Destination

Service

Security Domain

Address

Port

Security Domain

Address

Port

Proto

Application

Information

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC public API address

Log
aggregator

Cloud
management
domain

Atlas southbound

20514

TCP

RELP

Log collector in Atlas

CIC/infra
management
domain

CIC public API address

NMS Server

NOC

NOC

162

UDP

SNMP v2

FM:SNMP traps

CIC/infra
management
domain

Extreme Switch

123

NOC

NOC

123

UDP

ntp

ntp-server in NOC time server

For more information about how to set the rules in DC-FW, refer to DC Firewall Hardening Guide.

3.2.3   Authenticate NTP Server

Authenticate the upstream NTP servers as described in section NTP Authentication in the Configuration File Guide.

3.2.4   Change Legal Text Presented at Logon

To change the predefined message shown before logon attempts, update the config.yaml as described in section Legal Text Presented at Logon in the Configuration File Guide.

3.2.5   ScaleIO Management Tools

Note:  
This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used and deployed in CEE managed mode.

ScaleIO is accessible with GUI, which must be deployed outside CEE (for example in a NOC domain) on the public_vip network, on port 6611. The EMC ScaleIO GUI requires the MDM IP address, set to the public_vip address.

Managing ScaleIO via CLI is also possible from CEE nodes that are running the ScaleIO Meta Data Manager (MDM) component.

3.2.6   Location of Logs

Logs are written to the following locations:

3.3   Product Security Maintenance After Installation and Integration

This section contains information about the hardening activities that are performed after the installation and integration.

3.3.1   Manage Administrator Credentials

This section describes the management of administrator credentials.

3.3.1.1   Changing Password for Predefined Administrator Credentials

The passwords for the predefined administrator credentials must be changed on a regular basis.

For the detailed procedure of managing the following predefined administrator credentials, and for the procedure of changing the passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide:

The passwords must fulfill the strong password conditions. For the strong password conditions, see Section 4, or refer to your local company policy for defining strong passwords.

3.3.1.2   Changing Password for Operator Defined Administrator Credentials

It is strongly advised to regularly change the administrator passwords of the credentials that are defined by the operator in the system.

For detailed instructions on how to manage administrator passwords, refer to the Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide and the Security User Guide.

3.3.1.3   Creating Additional Credentials

During the first startup of the system, only the default administrator credentials are available. In addition to those credentials, each system administrator must use individual personal user accounts when logging in. The use of shared accounts is not recommended. For the vCIC hosts, the compute host, the storage solution, and for the Extreme switches, individual user accounts are provisioned in the LDAP server. For Atlas, user accounts are local.

For more information about credentials management, refer to Infrastructure Administrator Management Guide.

3.3.2   Change Certificates on vFuel

3.3.2.1   Change Cobbler Certificate

To change the Cobbler certificate on vFuel, perform the following steps:

  1. Acquire the new certificate and key in pem x509 format with the necessary characteristics (for example, using OpenSSL).
  2. Create a backup of the current certificate and key. The location of the certificate and the key are listed in /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf.
  3. Copy the new certificate (cobbler.crt) and key (cobbler.key) to the /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/cobbler/ directory on vFuel.
  4. Restart the Apache and Cobbler services:

    systemctl restart httpd.service
    systemctl restart cobblerd.service

  5. Check the availability of the Cobbler Web UI at https://<VFUEL_IP_ADDRESS>/cobbler_web.

3.3.2.2   Change Fuel Web GUI Certificate

  1. Acquire the new certificate and key in pem x509 format with the necessary characteristics (for example, using OpenSSL).
  2. Create a backup of the current certificate and key on vFuel. The location of the certificate and the key are listed in /etc/nginx/conf.d/services.conf. The location is by default /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/nginx/.
  3. Copy the new certificate (nginx.crt) and key (nginx.key) to the /var/lib/fuel/keys/master/nginx/ directory on vFuel.
  4. Restart the Apache and Nginx services:

    systemctl restart httpd.service
    systemctl restart nginx.service

  5. Check the availability of the Fuel Web UI at https://<VFUEL_IP_ADDRESS>:8443.

3.3.3   vCIC Host OS Hardening

After the installation, the root password must be changed. For the procedure of changing the root password, refer to the documents SW Installation in Multi-Server Deployment and SW Installation in Single Server Deployment.

The root access with a password to vCIC host is disabled by default, and only administrator accounts defined in the LDAP can be used for login.

The ceeadm account is not to be used for direct login after the administrator accounts in LDAP have been created.

3.3.4   Atlas User Management

For Atlas, user accounts are local. The initial system user, atlasadm, with sudo rights is created during the prehardening. The password of the atlasadm is set during the installation procedure.

For more information refer to Atlas SW Installation.

3.3.5   vFuel User Management

After the initial installation, only the root user exists in the vFuel server. The CEE deployment adds the ceeadm, cmha, and ceebackup users to the vFuel server.

It is possible to use the ceeadm user to access the vFuel server for creating the initial personal accounts. After that, the ceeadm user must only be used by infrastructure components, and during update and rollback.

It is recommended to create additional local Linux user accounts to the vFuel server for personnel administering the system.

It is possible to disable predefined users after the access is available with additional users, with the following command:

usermod -e 1 <username>

It is possible that root access is required during system update and expansion. In such cases, the root account must be enabled with the following command:

usermod -e "" root

Once the activities that require the root access have been completed, it is recommended to lock the account again.

The passwords for all vFuel administrators must be changed by using the passwd command on a regular basis.

It is possible to configure users with password expiry. Enter passwd -? for the available options.

3.3.6   GRUB User Management

After the successful deployment of the system, it is recommended to change the password for the Grand Unified Bootloader (GRUB) user, as described in section Change GRUB Password in the Runtime Configuration Guide.

For more information about the initial configuration of the GRUB password, used for CEE installation, refer to section GRUB Configuration in the Configuration File Guide.

3.3.7   Extreme Switch User Management

The Extreme switch default user account is defined as admin without a password defined. After the successful deployment of the system, it is recommended to change the password for the local admin user in the Extreme switch.

By default, CEE installation creates a user defined in the config.yaml system configuration, which is used by system components, such as OpenStack Neutron, for accessing and configuring the switch. This user must not be modified at runtime.

For managing the local switch accounts, refer to the Extreme EXOS documentation.

3.3.8   ScaleIO Access Control

Note:  
This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used.

Change the initial passwords as described in the "Access Control Settings" section of the ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7]. After changing the passwords, update the config.yaml with the new passwords. This is needed because ScaleIO administrator users are not managed by the Identity and Access Management (IdAM).

3.3.9   NeLS Access Control

Note:  
In CEE 6 NeLS connection is not mandatory.

Change the initial passwords as described in the NeLS document NeLS Security User Guide, Reference [6]. For more information and possible restrictions, refer to the Configuration File Guide.

3.3.10   Managing TLS Certificates in CEE

For more information on the necessary certificates and the tasks to perform before installation, refer to the CA and NBI Certificates for Secure HTTPS Access section of the documents SW Installation in Multi-Server Deployment and SW Installation in Single Server Deployment. To configure a secure NBI connection, refer to section Secure NBI API Endpoints in the Configuration File Guide.

3.3.10.1   Certificates for ScaleIO

Note:  
This section is only applicable if EMC ScaleIO storage solution is used.

Ensure that TLS certificates are available. For more information, refer to the "Communication Security Settings" section of the ScaleIO Security Configuration Guide, Reference [7].

3.3.11   CEE Infrastructure Network Hardening for SDN Tight Integration

The procedure described in this section serves to prevent Neutron from selecting VNIs used by HDS for infrastructure connectivity through the L3 fabric, by creating separate Neutron networks for the infrastructure networks. Perform the following steps:

  1. Log on to a vCIC as admin.
  2. Create an infrastructure project:

    openstack project create <project_name>

    Example output:

    root@cic-1:~# openstack project create cee_infra
    +-------------+----------------------------------+
    | Field       | Value                            |
    +-------------+----------------------------------+
    | description | None                             |
    | enabled     | True                             |
    | id          | 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69 |
    | name        | cee_infra                        |
    +-------------+----------------------------------+
    

    Note:  
    Make a note of the UUID shown in the id field, as it will be required later.

  3. Identify the VNIs used by the CEE infrastructure networks using the HDS CCM.
  4. For each VNI, create a Neutron network assigned to the UUID of the infrastructure project, with vxlan network type, using the VNI as segmentation_id.

    neutron net-create --tenant-id <project_UUID>
    --provider:network_type vxlan --provider:segmentation_id <network_VNI> <network_name>
    neutron net-create --tenant-id <project_UUID> --provider:network_type vxlan ⇒
    --provider:segmentation_id <network_VNI> <network_name>

    Note:  
    The UUID can be retrieved using openstack project list.

    For example:

Example 1   Neutron Network Creation for Infrastructure VNI

root@cic-1:~# neutron net-create --tenant-id 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69 ⇒
--provider:network_type vxlan --provider:segmentation_id 4098 cee_om_sp_1_forvlan201_cee1
Created a new network:
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Field                     | Value                                |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| admin_state_up            | True                                 |
| availability_zone_hints   |                                      |
| availability_zones        |                                      |
| created_at                | 2018-03-22T09:01:39                  |
| description               |                                      |
| id                        | c342a213-5cbe-4c65-8fac-b51a22e0fe92 |
| ipv4_address_scope        |                                      |
| ipv6_address_scope        |                                      |
| mtu                       | 1450                                 |
| name                      | cee_om_sp_1_forvlan201_cee1          |
| port_security_enabled     | True                                 |
| provider:network_type     | vxlan                                |
| provider:physical_network |                                      |
| provider:segmentation_id  | 4098                                 |
| router:external           | False                                |
| shared                    | False                                |
| status                    | ACTIVE                               |
| subnets                   |                                      |
| tags                      |                                      |
| tenant_id                 | 71e18a4e3d98463d9079ca2ea29cfe69     |
| updated_at                | 2018-03-22T09:01:39                  |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+

4   Strong Password Conditions

In order to set a strong password, the following conditions must be met:


Reference List

[1] Atlas Troubleshooting Guideline, 6/1553-CRA 119 1873/5 Uen B
[2] Cloud SDN Hardening Guideline, 2/1553-AXD 101 08/6-V1
[3] ISO27002: Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls ISO/IEC 27002 Second edition 2013-10-01, http://www.iso.org.
[4] ISO27011: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management guidelines for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002 ISO/IEC 27011 First edition 2008-12-15, http://www.iso.org.
[5] Logging, 3/198 22-AXD 101 08/6-V1
[6] NeLS Security User Guide, 5/1553-AVA 901 45/2
[7] ScaleIO® Security Configuration Guide, 2/1553-CNA 403 3308/5